Assessing Election Evidence: Odinga v Ruto in Kenya
A presidential election petition is not an investigation commissioned by the court. It is a case brought by parties, and the party asking the Supreme Court to overturn a declared presidential result must place reliable evidence before the judges. That practical point sits at the centre of Odinga & 16 others v Ruto & 10 others, the Supreme Court decision arising from Kenya’s 2022 presidential election.
The judgment is useful
because modern election disputes often arrive wrapped in technology. A
petitioner may allege server intrusion, altered forms, manipulated
transmissions, hidden users or unexplained differences between electronic and
paper records. Those allegations may be serious, but seriousness is not proof.
The Court’s approach was to ask a more disciplined question: what precise legal
duty was breached, what evidence proves the breach, who has direct knowledge of
that evidence, and what constitutional consequence follows if the allegation is
established?
The
dispute and the legal question
Kenya held its general
election on 9 August 2022. IEBC used the Kenya Integrated Electoral Management
System, commonly known as KIEMS, for biometric voter identification and for
transmission of images of polling-station results. On 15 August 2022, the IEBC
chairperson declared William Ruto president-elect with 7,176,141 votes, while
Raila Odinga received 6,942,930 votes.
Odinga, Martha Karua and
other petitioners challenged the result. Their claims included alleged
interference with the results-transmission system, differences among Forms 34A,
unexplained disparities between votes cast in the presidential and other elective
contests, effects of postponed elections, exclusion of four commissioners from
tallying and verification, and an argument that the winning candidate had not
crossed the constitutional threshold required by Article 138(4).
The legal question was
therefore broader than whether a computer system worked perfectly. The Court
had to decide whether the petitioners proved constitutional or statutory
non-compliance, irregularity or illegality to the applicable standard, and
whether any proved defect justified the exceptional remedy of invalidating a
presidential election.
Proof
comes before burden shifting
The Supreme Court began with
the legal burden. The person seeking nullification must first establish a
credible factual foundation. The Court does not assemble the petitioner’s case,
search for evidence that was not produced, or convert suspicion into fact
merely because the allegation concerns a system that is difficult for outsiders
to observe.
For ordinary election
irregularities, the Court applied a standard above the ordinary civil balance
of probabilities but below proof beyond reasonable doubt. Alleged election
offences require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also treated data-specific
constitutional claims, such as the numerical threshold for an outright
presidential victory, as requiring particularly exact proof.
Only after a petitioner
places sufficient material before the Court does an evidential burden move to
IEBC or another respondent to explain matters especially within its knowledge.
That shift does not transfer the ultimate legal burden. It simply prevents the
institution controlling the records from answering a properly supported claim
with silence or general assurances.
Technology
evidence must connect to the official system
The petitioners alleged
unauthorized access, manipulation and interference with Forms 34A and the
public results portal. The Supreme Court was not persuaded that the evidence
demonstrated systemic compromise. It distinguished a possible technical vulnerability
from proof that an election result was actually altered.
That distinction is
important for future litigation. A screenshot, an unexplained spreadsheet, a
social-media post or a technical assertion from a witness may raise a question,
but a court must still know where the material came from, how it was obtained,
what part of the official system it describes, whether the witness is qualified
to interpret it and how the alleged event affected an election record.
A strong technology case
therefore needs a chain from the pleaded allegation to identifiable digital or
documentary evidence. Server logs, access records, transmission timestamps,
hashes, original Forms 34A, polling-station copies and qualified expert analysis
can be powerful. Their value comes from traceability. Election technology is
not immune from challenge; it is simply subject to ordinary demands of
relevance, authenticity and proof.
Affidavits
are evidence, not containers for rumour
The judgment also contains a
practical warning about affidavits. A lawyer should not swear to contested
technical or factual matters merely because the client wishes those allegations
to appear in the record. Evidence is strongest when it comes from the person
who saw, created, received or analysed the material and can explain the basis
of that knowledge.
This matters especially in a
presidential petition because Article 140 creates an extremely compressed
timetable. Weak evidence cannot always be repaired later. A witness who
withdraws an affidavit, a deponent who lacks personal knowledge or an expert whose
method cannot be explained may leave a gap that cannot be filled after
pleadings close.
For litigants, the lesson is
to build the evidential file before filing. Polling agents should preserve
their copies of results forms, record objections when they occur and retain
contemporaneous messages or photographs. Technical experts should receive the
actual data they are asked to analyse, state their methodology and distinguish
what they observed from what they infer.
IEBC
is a commission, not only a chairperson
Although the Court dismissed
the petitions, it made an important institutional finding against IEBC’s
internal approach. Article 138(3)(c) assigns verification and tallying to the
Commission, while Article 138(10) gives the chairperson the distinct function
of declaring the result.
The Supreme Court therefore
declared regulation 87(3) unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to
vest verification and tallying solely in the chairperson to the exclusion of
the other commissioners. The legal point is easy to miss because it did not
alter the final result. Yet it is a binding constitutional rule about how the
presidential tally must be organized.
An election body cannot
defend a result only by proving the arithmetic. It must also respect the
constitutional allocation of responsibility inside the institution. Collective
verification creates internal accountability, while the chairperson’s declaration
gives the process a legally identifiable final act.
The
current section 83 position must be stated carefully
The statutory landscape has
changed since the 2022 judgment. The Election Laws (Amendment) Act 2017 had
changed section 83 of the Elections Act by replacing the earlier disjunctive
formulation with a conjunctive test. In October 2023, however, the Court of
Appeal in National Assembly v Katiba Institute & 6 others held the
amendment to section 83 unconstitutional and expressly clarified that the
pre-amendment form of section 83 continues to govern.
That development matters
when a lawyer uses the 2022 case today. The evidential principles from Odinga v
Ruto remain binding. But any current argument about the statutory nullification
test should also address the restored pre-amendment section 83 and subsequent
Supreme Court authority, rather than simply quoting the statutory wording that
existed during the 2022 election litigation.
The wider constitutional
foundation remains Articles 81 and 86. In Kombe v Karisa in 2024, the Supreme
Court again described those provisions as the bedrock of Kenya’s electoral
system, requiring elections to meet standards of accuracy, transparency, security
and verifiability.
Why
the decision matters
Odinga v Ruto is best
understood as a case about proof under constitutional pressure.
Presidential-election litigation is politically intense and technologically
complex, but the judicial task remains evidential. A court must decide from
admissible material whether a specified legal breach occurred and whether the
law attaches invalidity to it.
For petitioners, the
judgment discourages broad narratives unsupported by traceable records. For
IEBC, it creates the opposite obligation: election systems should be designed
to produce audit trails, preserve original forms and permit lawful scrutiny. The
more technology becomes part of election administration, the more important it
is that the technology leaves records capable of being explained in court.
The international context
points in the same direction. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights protects citizens’ right to vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections. The United Nations Human Rights Committee’s General
Comment No. 25 stresses that electoral arrangements must give effect to the
free expression of the electors’ will. In Kenya, that principle is implemented
through the more detailed constitutional standards in Articles 38, 81, 86 and
138.
The ordinary lesson is
therefore straightforward. A presidential result can be challenged, and
election technology can be scrutinised, but nullification requires a case built
from evidence rather than suspicion. The Court protects the vote by insisting both
that administrators keep verifiable records and that challengers prove the
particular breach they ask the Court to remedy.
Source
note
This article is based on Odinga & 16 others v Ruto & 10 others; Law Society of Kenya & 4 others (Amicus Curiae) [2022] KESC 56 (KLR), the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the Elections Act, National Assembly v Katiba Institute & 6 others [2023] KECA 1174 (KLR), Kombe v Karisa & 3 others [2024] KESC 25 (KLR), the Elections (General) Regulations, and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights together with UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 25.
Suggested citation:
Ronald
Serwanga, “Assessing Election Evidence: Odinga v Ruto in Kenya” East Africa
Legal Insight (9 September 2026).