Prescription for Continued Use of Forged Documents

Nyirabatoni v Gahima et al, Court of Appeal, [2023] 1 RLR 185, RS/INJUST/RP 00001/2019/CA, decided on 8 January 2021, is a useful Rwandan authority on prescription where the complaint is not only that a document was forged, but that the same document was later used as if it were genuine. The precedent is fairly narrow, yet it carries real practical weight. It may suggest that courts should be careful before treating an old document fraud complaint as automatically time barred. In some cases the first wrongful act may be old, while the later use of the document may still be recent enough to sustain criminal proceedings.

The case arose from a family and land dispute, but the lasting value of the judgment lies in criminal procedure. Nyirabatoni Elizabeth alleged that she had donated a plot of land to Gahima Dembe Eduard by a written donation agreement. At a later stage, Gahima relied on another document, described as a land sharing document involving himself, his brother and Nyirabatoni. That second document became the centre of the dispute. Nyirabatoni said it was not genuine and that the case concerned both forgery and the use of a forged document. The distinction may sound technical at first, but it mattered a great deal because limitation depends on the offence that is being alleged.

The police file was sent to the Prosecution, but the Prosecution closed it on the ground that the offence had already prescribed. Nyirabatoni then brought a private prosecution before the Intermediate Court of Gasabo against Gahima and Munyakarama Pierre, the former executive secretary who had written the contested document. The Intermediate Court dismissed the case for expiry of the limitation period. On appeal, she argued that the lower court had wrongly looked only at forgery and had failed to address the separate offence of using a forged document. The High Court maintained the dismissal, reasoning that her private prosecution was confined to the offence covered by the closed prosecution file.

That approach appears to have narrowed the file too much. Nyirabatoni later sought review due to injustice through the Office of the Ombudsman, and the President of the Supreme Court ordered review before the Court of Appeal. The main question before the Court of Appeal was whether she had actually accused Gahima and Munyakarama of using a forged document, and if so, whether that use was a continuing offence for purposes of prescription. The answer was important because if time began in 2000, when the document was allegedly created or altered, the complaint would fail. If time began when the document was last used in court, the 2013 complaint could still survive.

The Court of Appeal first looked at the record as a whole. It found that Nyirabatoni had not complained only about the making of the document. The police transmission file and the submissions in the private prosecution showed that she had also raised the use of a forged document. The Court considered that the High Court had made a material mistake by concentrating on the Prosecution closure document without examining the wider file. That mistake caused injustice because it kept the courts from considering an offence that could be analysed differently for prescription purposes.

The Court then explained the difference between an instantaneous offence and a continuing offence. For an instantaneous offence, time generally begins when the act is committed. For a continuing offence, time begins when the last criminal act comes to an end. This is the heart of the precedent. A forged document may be created on one date, but if it is knowingly produced later to support a false legal position, the later production is not just historical background. It may be part of the offence of use. The Court also referred to the ten year prescription period for felonies and to Penal Code provisions punishing forgery and the knowing use of a counterfeit document.

 

The rule may be put simply. Where the charge concerns the knowing use of a forged or counterfeited document, and the document is repeatedly deployed to maintain a false legal position, prescription runs from the last proven use of that document, not merely from the date when it was created or altered. This does not mean that every old forged document can be revived indefinitely. It means that the court must identify the correct offence and then ask when the last act forming part of that offence ceased. That small shift in reasoning can change the outcome of a criminal case.

On the facts, the Court found that the land sharing document had been used in civil litigation up to 7 September 2012. Nyirabatoni complained in 2013. Since the use of the counterfeited document was treated as a felony subject to a ten year prescription period, the claim was not time barred. The lower courts had therefore been wrong to dismiss the matter simply because the document carried an old date or was allegedly altered in 2000. The relevant date was the date of the last use relied upon as part of the criminal conduct.

The Court then separated the positions of the accused persons. It held that Gahima Dembe Eduard was guilty of using the counterfeited document because he had produced it in earlier proceedings, including before the Primary Court of Rusororo and on appeal before the Intermediate Court of Gasabo. The document had not been a harmless piece of paper sitting in a file. It was used to support the argument that the land had been shared, rather than donated, and it appears to have influenced the civil dispute. Gahima was sentenced to five years of imprisonment, suspended for one year, and a fine of 300,000 Rwandan francs.

Munyakarama Pierre was treated differently. Although the document itself was found to be counterfeited, the Court held that Nyirabatoni and the Prosecution had not proved that Munyakarama personally used the document in the relevant proceedings or was present when Gahima used it. He was acquitted of the offence of using a counterfeited document. This part of the judgment is worth pausing over. The doctrine of continuing offence does not lower the burden of proof. It only tells the court when time begins. The prosecution still has to connect each accused person to the acts that kept the offence alive.

The decision matters because limitation rules serve a serious purpose. They protect legal certainty and prevent very old accusations from hanging over people forever. Yet there is also a risk in treating prescription too mechanically. A forged land document, school certificate, company resolution, judgment execution document or administrative letter may continue to do harm whenever it is knowingly presented as genuine. In that kind of situation, the wrong is not necessarily exhausted on the day the paper is made. The paper may become powerful only when someone pulls it out and asks a court or public officer to act on it.

For lawyers, the case gives a practical method. Do not answer a limitation objection by looking only at the date printed on the document. Identify the offence with care. Separate forgery from use. List each act of use and prove the final date on which the document was relied upon. A complainant who pleads only forgery may lose a case that could have survived if the continued use of the forged document had been properly pleaded and proved. The point is not a trick of drafting. It is about describing the real criminal conduct with accuracy.

For prosecutors and investigators, the decision is also a quiet warning. Before closing a file for prescription, it is not enough to read the oldest date in the file and stop there. The full complaint, the police transmission file and the procedural history may reveal a later offence. For judges, the case shows why review due to injustice may be justified where a court has overlooked a pleaded offence that could materially change the result. That is a modest but important safeguard, especially in document fraud disputes where the file history can be as important as the disputed document itself.

The judgment should still be read with some restraint. It does not say that every later reference to a forged document automatically creates a continuing offence. The Court relied on evidence that the document was actually produced and relied upon in proceedings, and that Gahima was personally connected to that use. It required proof of the counterfeit character of the document, proof of use and proof linking the accused person to that use. That restraint keeps the doctrine from becoming too wide and preserves ordinary criminal law safeguards.

Nyirabatoni v Gahima et al is therefore a strong authority on prescription where forged documents continue to be used after their creation. Its main contribution is not dramatic. It is careful. It reminds courts that limitation analysis must begin with the right legal characterisation of the conduct. If the offence is continuing, time begins when the last criminal act ceases. In land and document fraud disputes, that rule may be the difference between premature dismissal and a proper hearing on the evidence.

Source note. This article is based on Nyirabatoni v Gahima et al, Court of Appeal, [2023] 1 RLR 185, RS/INJUST/RP 00001/2019/CA, decided on 8 January 2021. It also refers to Law No. 027/2019 of 19 September 2019 relating to criminal procedure and Law No. 68/2018 of 30 August 2018 determining offences and penalties in general. It is prepared for public legal education only and should not be treated as legal advice for any criminal complaint, private prosecution or land-document dispute.

Suggested citation

Ronald Serwanga, “Prescription for Continued Use of Forged Documents” East Africa Legal Insight (1 August 2026).