Prior Compensation in UNRA v Irumba

Uganda National Roads Authority v Irumba and Another, Constitutional Appeal No. 02 of 2014, [2015] UGSC 131, delivered on 29 October 2015, is one of Uganda’s leading Supreme Court decisions on compulsory acquisition of land. Its main precedent value lies in a clear constitutional rule. The State may acquire private land for a public purpose, but it cannot take possession first and leave compensation to follow later. Article 26 of the Constitution requires prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation before possession or acquisition. That point may look simple on paper, but in land acquisition disputes it can make all the difference.

The case was heard by the Supreme Court of Uganda sitting at Kampala. The panel included Katureebe CJ, Tumwesigye JSC, Arach Amoko JSC, Odoki Ag JSC, Tsekooko Ag JSC, Okello Ag JSC and Kitumba Ag JSC. The lead judgment was prepared by Kitumba Ag JSC, and the other justices agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. The size and status of the panel are worth noting because the case was not an ordinary quarrel about the value of a small plot. It concerned the relationship between public infrastructure and constitutional property rights.

The dispute arose from the project to upgrade the Hoima Kaiso Tonya road in Hoima District. The road was connected to access to Uganda’s oil areas in the Albertine Graben. The Uganda National Roads Authority, commonly known as UNRA, was responsible for implementing the project. Like many road projects, the works required additional land from affected persons. The Government proceeded under the Land Acquisition Act, Cap 226. The respondents, Irumba Asumani and Peter Magelah, complained that possession of their land had been taken before compensation had been paid.

Their complaint was not only about the amount of money offered. That is important. Many land acquisition disputes begin and end with valuation, as if the only issue is whether the landowner received enough. Irumba raised a more basic constitutional question. Can the acquiring authority enter and take possession before it has paid compensation? The respondents argued that section 7(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was inconsistent with Article 26 of the Constitution to the extent that it allowed possession before payment. In their view, the timing of compensation was not an administrative detail. It was part of the constitutional protection itself.

UNRA argued that the Land Acquisition Act was an existing law that predated the 1995 Constitution and that it should be construed under Article 274 with necessary modifications so as to conform to the Constitution. It also argued that Article 26 was not listed as one of the non derogable rights under Article 44, and that public interest, emergencies or major public projects could justify taking possession before compensation. That argument was not unusual from a government perspective. Public projects often come with pressure, deadlines and budget limits. A road may be needed urgently. Contractors may already be on site. Communities may be waiting for services. Still, the Court had to decide whether those pressures could weaken the express conditions in Article 26.

The Supreme Court rejected UNRA’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Constitutional Court. It held that section 7(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was inconsistent with Article 26 to the extent that it allowed compulsory taking of possession or acquisition of property without prior payment of compensation. The Court accepted that government has power to acquire land for public purposes. But that power is conditional. It exists within constitutional limits. Prior compensation was treated not as a matter of good administration, but as a constitutional requirement.

The Court also rejected the attempt to use Article 43 to reduce the protection in Article 26. Article 43 permits limitations on rights in some circumstances, but the Supreme Court reasoned that Article 26 already contains its own balance. It permits compulsory acquisition for public use, defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health. At the same time, it attaches safeguards, including prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation before possession or acquisition and access to a court of law. The same public interest that justifies acquisition cannot then be used to remove the compensation condition that the Constitution itself has imposed.

The rule from the case is direct. Where the State compulsorily acquires land or takes possession of private property, Article 26 requires prompt, fair and adequate compensation before the taking of possession or acquisition. Affected persons must also have access to court. Old legislation such as the Land Acquisition Act must be read and applied consistently with the Constitution. Where it permits what the Constitution forbids, it cannot prevail. Public infrastructure, even when genuinely important, must be delivered through constitutional methods.

This rule matters because compulsory acquisition places the individual landowner in a vulnerable position. The State has planning power, survey teams, valuers, budgets, police support and legal officers. The ordinary landowner may have a family home, a garden, a shop, a burial place or a small rental structure on the land. If possession can be taken first and payment delayed, that person may be forced to carry the cost of a public project. They may have to rent elsewhere, lose crops, close a business or wait years for money that should have come before displacement. Irumba prevents that imbalance from becoming normal administrative practice.

The decision also shows that compensation is not only about amount. Timing matters. A person may eventually receive a fair figure, but if the money arrives after the land has been taken and after the person has already suffered disruption, the constitutional promise has been weakened. Prior compensation gives the owner some ability to plan, relocate, challenge the award or negotiate from a less desperate position. It recognises that land is not just an item on a valuation sheet. It can be home, livelihood, identity, security and future inheritance.

The case is particularly significant in a country where development projects often require land. Roads, electricity lines, pipelines, dams, oil infrastructure, urban expansion and public buildings may all involve acquisition. The Supreme Court did not deny the importance of such projects. The Hoima Kaiso Tonya road itself had a clear public development purpose. But the Court’s reasoning suggests that development is not a shortcut around the Constitution. A project may be useful, urgent and nationally important, yet still unlawful if it takes land before satisfying Article 26.

For government agencies, the practical lesson is planning. Compensation must be budgeted as a condition of lawful acquisition, not treated as an afterthought. Before taking possession, an acquiring authority should identify affected persons, conduct valuation, communicate awards, deal with objections where possible, pay compensation and leave room for access to court. If a project is designed on the assumption that land can be taken first and paid for later, litigation is likely. That litigation may delay the very project the Government hoped to accelerate.

For landowners and communities, Irumba gives a strong legal language for challenging unlawful acquisition. Affected persons are not limited to saying that the valuation is too low. They may also challenge the legality of taking possession before payment. That is a different and often more powerful claim. It turns the dispute from a narrow valuation disagreement into a constitutional question about deprivation of property. Public interest lawyers and civil society actors can also use the case to insist that land acquisition procedures protect people before bulldozers arrive.

The decision fits into Uganda’s broader constitutional jurisprudence on supremacy of the Constitution. Article 274 preserves existing laws, but only with modifications, adaptations and qualifications necessary to bring them into conformity with the Constitution. Irumba confirms that this preservation clause does not save unconstitutional statutory powers in their old form. Old laws must bend to the Constitution. Where an old statute permits possession before compensation, and the Constitution requires compensation before possession, the Constitution controls the result.

The case also helps explain when land disputes become constitutional matters. Not every disagreement over land value belongs in the Constitutional Court. Ordinary valuation disputes may be handled through ordinary legal channels. Irumba was different because it required the courts to compare section 7(1) of the Land Acquisition Act with Article 26 and decide whether the statute was valid. That made it a genuine constitutional interpretation case rather than a simple enforcement claim.

The later relevance of Irumba is easy to see. Any proposal to make government acquisition easier by allowing possession before payment must confront the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 26. The decision became a central reference point in debates about land reform, infrastructure and the rights of affected persons. It may not solve every practical problem in land acquisition, especially where ownership is disputed or valuation is delayed. But it does set the starting point. The State must respect property rights while pursuing public projects.

Irumba remains a landmark because it gives practical force to a constitutional promise. Public interest matters, but it does not erase private rights. Development matters, but it must obey the Constitution. The decision’s strength is that it refuses to treat compensation as a favour paid when convenient. It treats compensation as a condition of lawful taking. For landowners, government agencies, judges, investors and researchers, that is the enduring lesson. In Uganda, compulsory acquisition is lawful only when the public purpose is pursued together with prompt, fair and adequate prior compensation.

Source note. This article is based on Uganda National Roads Authority v Irumba and Another, Constitutional Appeal No. 02 of 2014, [2015] UGSC 131, Supreme Court of Uganda, judgment delivered on 29 October 2015, with reference to Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 and section 7(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is prepared for public legal education only and should not be treated as legal advice for any land acquisition dispute.

Suggested citation

Ronald Serwanga, "Prior Compensation in UNRA v Irumba" East Africa Legal Insight (22 June 2026).