Tanzania Media Law and the EACJ Rule of Law Rulings
How regional Treaty standards tested Tanzania’s media statute
Contents
When media rules become a regional
question
What the organisations challenged
The issue before the Court
What the Court held
The rule of law and expression principle
Why the decision matters
How the parties built their arguments
Earlier and later cases
What lawmakers and journalists can take
from the case
The practical lesson
When media rules become a regional question
A media law may look like a national matter
because it regulates local journalists, local publications and local licensing
institutions. The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) showed in Media Council
of Tanzania and Others v Attorney General of Tanzania that the national setting
does not place legislation beyond regional scrutiny. Tanzania had joined the
East African Community (EAC) and accepted Treaty commitments to uphold
democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency and good governance. The
Court examined whether provisions of the Media Services Act, 2016 were
consistent with those commitments, focusing on how vague offences, licensing
powers and restrictions affected freedom of expression.
The judgment is valuable because it gives a
legal route for testing legislation that chills public discussion without
asking the EACJ to become a general constitutional court for every Partner
State. The applicants relied on Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the EAC Treaty, read
with the regional obligations to act consistently with the Treaty. They also
placed the freedom of expression in the context of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Court treated expression as part of the governance values that the Partner
States had bound themselves to respect.
What the organisations challenged
The applicants were the Media Council of
Tanzania, the Legal and Human Rights Centre, and the Tanzania Human Rights
Defenders Coalition. They filed the reference in January 2017, challenging
several provisions of Tanzania’s Media Services Act No. 12 of 2016. Their
challenge covered restrictions on content, journalist accreditation, criminal
defamation, false news and rumours, sedition, and ministerial powers over
imported publications and media content. They argued that the provisions were
vague, overbroad and capable of suppressing legitimate reporting and criticism.
The Court heard the case in its First
Instance Division. The judges were Principal Judge Monica K. Mugenyi, Deputy
Principal Judge Faustin Ntezilyayo, and Justices Fakihi Jundu, Audace Ngiye and
Charles Nyachae. The judgment was delivered on 28 March 2019 and is reported at
[2015–2017] EACJLR 864. The full case name and reference matter because the
decision is not a general advisory opinion: it came from a concrete Treaty
reference brought by civic and media organisations against the Attorney General
representing Tanzania.
The provisions identified by the applicants
included section 7(3), concerning content that could not be published; sections
13, 14, 19, 20 and 21, concerning accreditation and media regulation; sections
35 to 40, which created criminal offences associated with defamation; sections
50 and 54, concerning false news and rumours; sections 52 and 53, relating to
sedition; and sections 58 and 59, which gave the Minister powers concerning
publications and media content. The Court did not strike down the whole Act. It
declared a specified set of provisions inconsistent with the Treaty.
The issue before the Court
The central question was whether the
challenged provisions of the Media Services Act were consistent with Tanzania’s
commitments under Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the EAC Treaty, particularly the
principles of democracy, rule of law, accountability, transparency and good
governance. In practical terms, the Court had to assess whether legal
restrictions on media activity were framed with enough clarity, pursued a
legitimate public purpose and were proportionate to the harm they sought to
prevent.
This approach matters because freedom of
expression is not absolute. A state may regulate publication to protect rights,
national security, public order or other legitimate interests, subject to the
governing legal standards. The dispute was therefore not simply “government may
never regulate media.” It was whether the particular rules gave officials too
much discretion, failed to tell people what conduct was prohibited, or imposed
criminal and administrative consequences broader than necessary. That is the
point at which a media statute becomes a rule-of-law problem.
What the Court held
The Court found that the specified parts of
section 7(3), sections 19, 20 and 21, sections 35 to 40, sections 50 and 54,
sections 52 and 53, and sections 58 and 59 violated Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of
the Treaty. It directed Tanzania to take the measures necessary to bring the
Media Services Act into compliance with the EAC Treaty. Each party was ordered
to bear its own costs.
In examining section 7, the Court was
concerned that broad and imprecise language left media organisations and
journalists without a sufficiently clear guide to what could lawfully be
published. Restrictions on expression must be stated in a way that allows a
person to understand the line between permitted and prohibited conduct. The
state also had to establish a legitimate aim and show that the restriction was
proportionate. Simply placing a restriction in legislation does not prove that
it is necessary or fair.
The Court also examined criminal penalties
for defamation and publication offences. It was not persuaded that the
government had demonstrated a direct and immediate connection between the
threats it identified and the criminal sanctions imposed. Provisions dealing
with false news, rumours and statements likely to cause public fear or alarm
were found objectionable where their breadth and vagueness made it difficult
for people to predict how the law might be used. The Court similarly considered
that the Minister’s extensive powers over publications and media content lacked
sufficient limits and clarity.
The result was a Treaty judgment, not a
declaration that the EACJ had invalidated every aspect of Tanzanian media law
for all purposes. The Court identified specific provisions and required the
state to bring them into line with its Treaty commitments. That distinction
helps explain both the reach and the limits of the decision. It is a binding
judicial finding about the challenged statutory provisions and the regional
obligations engaged, while the domestic steps to amend or replace legislation
remain matters for the national legal system.
The rule of law and expression principle
The principle emerging from the case is
that a Partner State must ensure that laws regulating expression are clear
enough for people to guide their conduct, pursue a legitimate purpose and avoid
unnecessary or disproportionate interference with speech. Where the law uses
vague terms, gives officials broad unreviewable discretion or attaches severe
penalties without a demonstrated need, it can violate the EAC Treaty’s
rule-of-law and good-governance commitments.
This rule is useful beyond journalism. It
applies wherever a government uses criminal or administrative law to regulate
public discussion, advocacy or access to information. A person should be able
to know in advance what the law prohibits and what safeguards constrain
official power. This is the everyday meaning of legality: the state may enforce
valid rules, but it should not leave the boundaries of lawful speech to
shifting personal judgment by an official.
The judgment does not make every imprecise
phrase automatically unlawful, nor does it remove a state’s responsibility to
protect people from defamation, incitement or genuine threats to public order.
It requires the state to connect restriction to purpose and evidence. A law
aimed at a real harm must still be tailored so that it does not capture
ordinary reporting, criticism or public-interest discussion. This prevents
legitimate public purposes from becoming a blank cheque for suppressing
inconvenient speech.
Why the decision matters
For journalists, the case addresses a fear
that is often more powerful than a prosecution: uncertainty. If a reporter
cannot predict whether a story will be characterised as “false,” “seditious,”
or likely to “cause alarm,” self-censorship becomes rational. Broad
accreditation rules can similarly place the ability to report in the hands of a
regulator. The Court’s insistence on precision and proportionality makes those
features legally reviewable rather than merely matters of political concern.
For readers and communities, media freedom
is not only a professional privilege. It is one way people learn how public
institutions spend money, exercise power, respond to emergencies and treat
marginalised groups. Rules that deter reporting can reduce the information
available to voters and residents. The Court’s Treaty framing connects those
practical effects to the regional commitments on democracy and accountability.
For governments, the decision provides a
drafting test. If a Minister can decide which publications may circulate
without clear statutory criteria, if criminal provisions rely on undefined
concepts, or if the law punishes broad categories of expression without a close
link to a concrete harm, the regulation is vulnerable. A better framework can
still address accuracy, professional standards and genuinely harmful conduct,
but it needs precise definitions, independent decision-making, fair procedure,
review rights and proportionate consequences.
The decision is also important
institutionally. It confirms that a Partner State cannot avoid Treaty
accountability simply by describing a dispute as a domestic constitutional
matter. The EACJ’s jurisdiction is to interpret and apply the Treaty. When national
legislation plausibly conflicts with Articles 6(d) and 7(2), the Court can
examine that conflict. At the same time, applicants must plead the Treaty route
with care and explain how a specific law or action undermines the principles
agreed by the states.
How the parties built their arguments
The applicants’ strongest move was to
challenge identifiable statutory provisions rather than make a broad claim that
Tanzania was hostile to the press. They mapped the alleged harms to particular
parts of the Act: content limits, licensing and accreditation, criminal
liability, false-news offences, sedition and ministerial control. That
structure allowed the Court to consider provision by provision whether the
language and powers were compatible with Treaty principles. Their use of the
African Charter and ICCPR helped explain why expression matters, while Articles
6(d) and 7(2) supplied the EACJ’s jurisdictional and normative framework.
The government’s position had to confront
the legal quality of the statutory controls, not merely the state’s general
interest in regulating media. A persuasive defence in this kind of case would
show the particular harm addressed by each rule, explain why narrower measures
would not work, and point to safeguards that limit arbitrary use. Where a
statute uses broad terms, a state may also need to show a settled
interpretation or procedural controls. In the decision, the Court concluded
that the Respondent had not established the legitimate aim and proportionality
for relevant restrictions or a direct and immediate link for some criminal
provisions.
The reported judgment does not give a basis
to claim that a single advocacy mistake determined the outcome. A more careful
conclusion is that the applicants constructed a provision-specific challenge
and the government’s justification was not sufficient for those provisions.
Lawyers in future cases can improve on either side by assembling the
legislative history, enforcement examples, prosecution data, regulator
decisions, comparative text and evidence of actual chilling effects. A court
can test a proportionality argument more fairly when both the harm and the
burden are documented.
Earlier and later cases
The case fits the EACJ’s growing
Treaty-based rule-of-law jurisprudence. In James Katabazi and Others v
Secretary General of the East African Community and Attorney General of Uganda,
Reference No. 1 of 2007, the Court explained that it could decide a Treaty
question even when the facts also raised human-rights issues. It did not
thereby become a general human-rights court under Article 27(2); rather, it
could assess whether state conduct breached the principles set out in the
Treaty. Media Council applies that logic to national legislation regulating
expression.
The decision also follows EACJ cases such
as Attorney General of Kenya v Independent Medical Legal Unit, Appeal No. 1 of
2011, and Attorney General of the Republic of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba, Appeal
No. 1 of 2012, which treat Treaty principles as judicially enforceable
commitments. Those cases help explain why Articles 6(d) and 7(2) can do legal
work rather than serve as political aspirations. The Media Council judgment
adds a detailed statutory review to that line.
Later litigation shows that a judgment does
not automatically secure compliance. In subsequent proceedings involving Media
Council of Tanzania and others, the applicants alleged that sections of the Act
previously declared inconsistent with the Treaty were used to suspend the
newspaper Uhuru. That later case underscores the difference between winning a
declaration and obtaining practical implementation. The original reference
remains important, but it also teaches advocates to monitor compliance and preserve
evidence of later enforcement where a state has not amended or ceased using the
challenged rules.
There was no separate dissenting judgment
in Reference No. 2 of 2017. The panel reached a collective judgment. The
Court’s nuanced approach—finding that identified statutory provisions breached
the Treaty while not purporting to decide every media-law question—is the
authoritative interpretation, not a divided court’s competing view.
What lawmakers and journalists can take from the case
For lawmakers, begin with the harm the law
is intended to address and define it clearly. An offence should tell a
journalist or publisher what conduct triggers liability. A licensing or
accreditation system should have objective eligibility criteria, transparent
decisions, reasons, review rights and a decision-maker insulated from political
pressure. A Minister should not have open-ended authority over publications
without defined grounds and a meaningful way to challenge the decision. Civil
remedies and professional standards may be more proportionate than criminal
punishment for many forms of media dispute.
For journalists and publishers, the case is
a reminder to keep records. Save notices from regulators, rejected
accreditation applications, warnings, prosecution papers, publication decisions
and editorial communications that show how an unclear law affected reporting.
If a law is applied selectively, gather comparable examples. A Treaty claim is
stronger when it shows the law’s text and its real-world operation, and
explains how the state’s conduct conflicts with a specific regional obligation.
For civil-society advocates, explain the
connection between individual speech restrictions and regional governance. A
case should not rest only on the proposition that freedom of expression is
important. It should show how the challenged provisions undermine accountable
government, public participation, transparency or the rule of law, and why the
EAC Treaty makes those principles legally relevant. Where an African or
international instrument is cited, explain its interpretive role rather than
presenting it as if the EACJ were directly applying it as its own constitutive
treaty.
The practical lesson
The Media Council reference is a clear
example of national legislation being tested against regional obligations. It
shows that an EAC Partner State can regulate media, but that regulation must be
lawful in the full sense: clear, justified, limited and consistent with the
Treaty. The Court’s focus on vague language, sweeping discretion and inadequate
justification turns broad governance values into a practical legal standard
that an ordinary reader can understand.
For a journalist, the lesson is that rules
restricting reporting should be precise enough to follow and fair enough to
challenge. For a government, the lesson is that public order and professional
standards do not excuse vague laws or unchecked power. For lawyers, the case
rewards a direct method: identify the provisions, establish their operation,
connect them to the Treaty, and ask for a remedy that will produce real
compliance. That is why the decision remains a useful precedent for media
freedom, expression and rule of law across the EAC.
Sources Mentioned in This Case Analysis
The authorities discussed are Media Council
of Tanzania, Legal and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania Human Rights Defenders
Coalition v Attorney General of Tanzania, Reference No. 2 of 2017, [2015–2017]
EACJLR 864; the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community,
especially Articles 6(d), 7(2), 8(1)(c), 27(1) and 30(1); the Media Services
Act No. 12 of 2016 (Tanzania); the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, especially
Article 19; James Katabazi and Others v Secretary General of the EAC and
Attorney General of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007; Attorney General of Kenya
v Independent Medical Legal Unit, Appeal No. 1 of 2011; Attorney General of the
Republic of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba, Appeal No. 1 of 2012; and the later EACJ
proceedings involving Media Council of Tanzania and others, including Reference
No. 37 of 2021.
Suggested Citation
Ronald Serwanga, “Tanzania Media Law and the EACJ Rule of Law Rulings” East Africa Legal Insight (13 October 2026).