Internet Speech and EACJ Review of Tanzania’s Rules
The EACJ dismissed a challenge to Tanzania’s 2020 online-content rules. The decision clarifies the Court’s approach to licensing, expression and proportionality, while leaving practical questions about chilling effects for future cases.
Contents
The challenge to
online regulation
What the applicants
said
The legal question
before the EACJ
The Court’s
decision
The rule on freedom
of expression
Why the reasoning
matters
The argument the
applicants had to meet
What changed during
the case
Earlier cases and
regional standards
Tanzania and
comparative constitutional law
What the decision
does not settle
Practical lessons
for civil society and regulators
The precedent’s
value
Online speech has become one of the main
ways East Africans communicate, report, organize and criticize public
decisions. Rules that regulate bloggers, online media and social-media services
can therefore affect more than a communications business: they can influence
what ordinary people feel safe saying. In Legal and Human Rights Centre and
Others v Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania, the East African
Court of Justice (EACJ) considered a challenge to Tanzania’s Electronic and
Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2020. The Court dismissed
the reference, concluding that the challenged rules did not violate Articles
6(d), 7(2) and 8(1)(c) of the EAC Treaty. The decision matters because it sets
out a regional framework for reviewing online-speech restrictions, but its
dismissal should not be mistaken for a conclusion that every application of the
regulations is lawful or harmless.
The full citation is Legal and Human Rights
Centre and Others v Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania
(Reference No. 30 of 2020) [2026] EACJ 7 (31 March 2026) (First Instance
Division). The EACJ case record names the four applicants as Legal and Human
Rights Centre, Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition, Media Council of
Tanzania and Centre for Strategic Litigation. The bench consisted of Principal
Judge Yohane Bokobora Masara, Deputy Principal Judge Richard Wejuli Wabwire,
Justice Richard Muhumuza, Justice Gacuko Leonard and Justice Kayembe Ignace
Rene Kasanda. The published record identifies a judgment of the Division; no
separate dissenting opinion is identified in the materials reviewed for this
article.
The challenge to online regulation
The applicants challenged the Online
Content Regulations as an interference with freedom of expression and the
Treaty’s commitments to democracy, rule of law and good governance. They argued
that the rules required registration or licensing of online content providers,
imposed costs and compliance duties, gave the Tanzania Communications
Regulatory Authority (TCRA) excessive discretion, used vague descriptions of
prohibited content, allowed disclosure of third-party information without
adequate safeguards and exposed users or providers to severe penalties. They
asked the EACJ to declare specified regulations inconsistent with the Treaty
and to require Tanzania to amend or stop applying them.
The Government defended the rules as a
lawful way to regulate a sensitive sector, protect children and the public, and
ensure responsible online communication. It relied on national legislation and
on the fact that some regulations had been amended, repealed or replaced while
the case was pending. The case therefore raised two kinds of questions. One was
substantive: whether the regulations restricted expression in a way
inconsistent with regional obligations. The other was procedural and temporal:
whether provisions that had changed still presented a live dispute requiring a
court ruling.
The legal question before the EACJ
The central issue was whether the
challenged provisions of the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online
Content) Regulations, 2020 breached Articles 6(d), 7(2) and 8(1)(c) of the EAC
Treaty. Those provisions commit Partner States to the rule of law and good
governance, require adherence to fundamental principles of the Community, and
require states to honour Treaty obligations. The applicants linked freedom of
expression to these Treaty duties. The Court had to decide whether the
challenged rules were sufficiently clear, pursued a legitimate aim and used
proportionate means to achieve it.
A second issue was the EACJ’s role. The
Court is not a general appellate regulator for national laws, nor does it
replace Tanzania’s constitutional courts. Its authority under Article 27(1) is
to interpret and apply the Treaty. It can consider national legislation where
the claim shows how the State’s conduct breaches an EAC obligation. The
question was therefore not only whether the applicants had described a rights
restriction, but whether they had shown that the restriction crossed the Treaty
standard of legality, democracy and good governance.
The Court’s decision
The Court dismissed Reference No. 30 of
2020 for want of merit. It applied a three-part approach to the restrictions on
expression: whether a limitation was prescribed by law in clear and accessible
terms, whether it pursued a pressing and substantial objective, and whether the
means were proportionate. It treated the objectives of child protection, public
security and responsible online communication as legitimate. It found that the
definitions and rules challenged before it were sufficiently clear for the
purposes of the Treaty test, and considered the registration and licensing
requirements administrative and technical rather than an impermissible
restraint on press freedom.
The Court also considered how the wider
statutory framework operated. Where the regulations did not themselves set out
a right of appeal, other national legislation supplied a review route for
administrative decisions. It viewed the regulatory scheme as a body of
complementary laws rather than isolating one instrument from the system around
it. It found that some challenged provisions had been deleted or amended during
the proceedings and treated those aspects as moot where a ruling would no
longer have practical effect. The final order dismissed the reference and
required each party to bear its own costs. The Court did not award damages or
direct Tanzania to repeal the regulations.
The rule on freedom of expression
The decision states a familiar but
important rule: a restriction on expression must be created by law, pursue a
legitimate and sufficiently important objective, and be proportionate to that
objective. A government cannot justify an expression restriction merely by
calling it public order or child protection. It must connect the restriction to
the problem it seeks to address and avoid burdening speech more than necessary.
The EACJ accepted the challenged measures on the record before it, including
its assessment of clarity, licensing, children’s safety and available
administrative appeals.
The judgment does not mean that vague or
broadly framed speech offences are automatically acceptable. Nor does it mean
that an administrative licence cannot chill journalism, criticism or public
participation in practice. A regulation may appear clear in the abstract and
still be applied selectively or unpredictably. A licence may be described as
administrative and still become a barrier if the cost, delay or discretionary
criteria prevent independent voices from operating. Those concerns must be
tested with evidence about the actual rule, its application and its effects.
The judgment’s holding is tied to the provisions, arguments and evidence before
the Court in this reference.
Why the reasoning matters
The case is important because it places
online communication within regional governance law. In Article 6(d) and
Article 7(2), the EAC Treaty includes the rule of law, democracy,
accountability, transparency and human-rights standards among the conditions of
regional integration. A government’s approach to internet speech can implicate
these commitments because online platforms now host political debate, news,
advocacy and ordinary social life. The Court’s willingness to apply an
expression-protection test under the Treaty confirms that digital regulation is
not outside regional scrutiny simply because the regulated conduct takes place
online.
At the same time, the result marks a
cautious approach to that scrutiny. The Court deferred to the State’s asserted
regulatory purposes and treated licensing as an administrative process where it
saw a surrounding system of safeguards. That approach leaves an important
practical issue: whether those safeguards are accessible and effective for a
small blogger, a human-rights defender or a rural media organization. A formal
appeal route can be of little value if a person cannot afford it, does not know
it exists or faces immediate closure before review. Future litigants can
develop this point through evidence rather than rely on abstract claims that
regulation chills speech.
The argument the applicants had to meet
The applicants’ challenge raised broad
concerns about fees, licensing, discretion, vague prohibitions, disclosure and
penalties. The Court rejected the reference after considering those issues
through its proportionality framework. A successful future challenge would need
to engage the same framework at the provision-by-provision level. Counsel
should identify the exact words said to be vague, explain the range of conduct
they could capture, show how officials have interpreted them, and connect the
uncertainty to a foreseeable risk of sanction. Where the objection is to a
licence, evidence should show costs, processing delays, rejection rates,
compliance burdens and the impact on independent or community media.
A strong expression case also distinguishes
the State’s objective from the breadth of the measure. Protecting children from
harmful material is legitimate; that does not automatically prove that a
particular filtering or age-verification obligation is workable, necessary or
least restrictive. Protecting privacy is important; that does not necessarily
justify forcing a provider to disclose personal information without safeguards.
Counsel should offer workable alternatives—such as tailored age controls, judicial
authorization, notice, a defined appeal process or narrower language—and
explain why they would achieve the objective with less harm to expression. This
helps a court compare real options rather than choose between regulation and no
regulation.
What changed during the case
Some of the challenged regulations were
amended or repealed while the reference was pending. The Court treated certain
issues as moot where the legal provisions no longer operated and an order would
not change the parties’ position. This is a common problem in public-law
litigation. A state can revise a rule while proceedings are underway, leaving
the court to decide whether the dispute remains live, whether the replacement
rule has the same effect, and whether a declaration is still necessary to guide
future conduct.
For civil-society counsel, the lesson is to
track every amendment and plead its consequences promptly. If a provision has
been replaced, identify whether the new wording preserves the same restriction,
whether enforcement continues under a different section, and whether the
applicants still face a real risk. If the challenged provision has disappeared
completely, a court may decline to decide it. Strategic litigants should also
consider whether they can challenge a later implementing decision, establish a
continuing legal effect or seek a remedy directed at a live practice. The
appropriate route will depend on the facts and procedural rules; a past dispute
cannot always be kept alive merely because the legal issue remains important.
Earlier cases and regional standards
The EACJ’s decision should be read
alongside earlier regional cases involving media and expression. In Media
Council of Tanzania and Others v Attorney General of the United Republic of
Tanzania, Reference No. 2 of 2017, the Court considered Tanzania’s Media
Services Act and found provisions incompatible with Treaty principles.
Burundian Journalists Union v Attorney General of Burundi, Reference No. 7 of
2013, and The Managing Editor, Mseto and Others v Attorney General of Tanzania,
Reference No. 7 of 2016, also form part of the Court’s record on media freedom
and regulatory power. These cases show that the EACJ has sometimes found
national media restrictions to breach the Treaty; Reference No. 30 of 2020
demonstrates that the outcome depends on the specific measure and the proof of
its impact.
Internationally, Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of
expression while allowing restrictions that meet the conditions of lawfulness,
legitimate aim and necessity. Article 9 of the African Charter protects the
right to receive information and express and disseminate opinions. The EACJ
referred to international and comparative standards as interpretive material,
but its operative task remained interpretation of the EAC Treaty. The African
Commission’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information in Africa also offers regional guidance on online speech, although
the judgment’s binding order was based on the Treaty claim before it.
Tanzania and comparative constitutional law
Tanzania’s Constitution, particularly
Article 18, protects freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive and
disseminate information. Article 30 recognizes that rights may be subject to
lawful limitations, while constitutional proceedings are available through
national law. The Electronic and Postal Communications Act and the Tanzania
Communications Regulatory Authority Act provide statutory context for the rules
and their review mechanisms. The EACJ did not replace domestic constitutional
remedies, but its interpretation of Treaty obligations operates alongside
national law and may influence how a state designs and applies digital
regulation.
In Kenya, the Constitution’s Article 33
protects expression and Article 24 sets a structured test for limiting rights.
Uganda’s Constitution protects freedom of speech and expression under Article
29, subject to Article 43’s general limitations clause. These systems are not
identical, and the EACJ judgment does not determine their meaning. They are
useful comparisons because they emphasize that a restriction should be
justified and assessed for its effects. For regional practitioners, comparative
analysis can illuminate the proportionality question but should not substitute
for the precise Treaty provisions and the national legal framework governing
the measure under challenge.
What the decision does not settle
The judgment does not establish that all
the Online Content Regulations remain in force in the same form as when the
case was filed. Amendments and repeals must be checked against the current
official gazette before a publisher, provider or user relies on a particular
regulation. It also does not resolve every complaint about the TCRA’s
day-to-day use of licensing powers, the legality of a specific takedown
request, the fairness of a particular prosecution or the proportionality of a
penalty imposed in an individual case. Those questions may require a separate
domestic or regional claim with evidence about a concrete decision.
The Court’s dismissal is therefore both a
precedent and a boundary. It is persuasive on the EACJ’s three-part review of
expression restrictions, the characterization of licensing and the relevance of
complementary statutory appeals. It is not a blanket approval for any future
online-speech control. Nor is it a dissenting judgment or divided opinion: the
published report records a decision of the Division without a separately
reported dissent. Readers should describe the outcome accurately and avoid saying
that the Court “struck down” or “upheld every provision” when the judgment also
treated changed provisions as moot.
Practical lessons for civil society and regulators
For civil-society groups, the practical
task is to document how an online rule works in real life. Keep notices,
applications, receipts, emails, licensing decisions, platform restrictions,
content removal requests and examples of speech affected. Record whether the
decision-maker gave reasons, whether an appeal was available, how long it took
and whether the appeal could prevent immediate harm. Evidence of a chilling
effect is stronger when it shows a specific speaker or outlet changed conduct
because of a credible risk, rather than simply stating that regulation may
discourage speech.
For regulators, the judgment should not be
read as permission to rely on broad discretion without safeguards. Clear
definitions, published criteria, consistent decision-making, reasoned orders
and prompt independent review make the system more predictable. Child
protection and prevention of serious harms are legitimate public objectives,
but measures should be tailored to the risk and should avoid unnecessary
surveillance or the suppression of lawful discussion. Transparent reporting of
enforcement outcomes can help the public and courts evaluate whether the rules
are being used fairly.
For lawyers, the EACJ reference deadline
also deserves early attention. Article 30(2) requires references to be filed
within two months of the challenged act or when it became known. A regulatory
instrument may have been made years earlier, but a later discrete enforcement
decision can raise a distinct cause of action if pleaded and supported. Counsel
should identify the precise act, when it took place, the relevant Treaty
obligation and whether domestic remedies are appropriate or required for the
desired relief. The best case record combines doctrinal analysis with a clear
chronology.
The precedent’s value
Reference No. 30 of 2020 is a persuasive
civic-rights precedent because it explains how the EACJ will evaluate a claim
that national online rules conflict with regional duties of good governance and
respect for rights. Its value is not that the applicants won; they did not. Its
value is that the Court stated the test, applied it to licensing and content
rules, considered appeals available under related laws and declined to decide
provisions that were no longer in force. That reasoning gives future litigants
a map of the evidentiary and legal work required.
The decision should be read together with the earlier Media Council of Tanzania case and later developments in the challenged regulatory framework. It reminds governments that digital regulation must be legally intelligible and proportionate, and it reminds advocates that broad constitutional language must be translated into evidence about specific provisions and actual effects. For ordinary readers, the point is simple: online rules can be challenged in court, but a court will ask what the rule says, what public purpose it serves, how it is enforced and whether a less restrictive way could do the job.
Sources Mentioned in This Article
The principal authority is Legal and Human
Rights Centre and Others v Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania
(Reference No. 30 of 2020) [2026] EACJ 7 (31 March 2026), First Instance
Division. The relevant Treaty provisions are Articles 4, 6(d), 7(2), 8(1)(c),
27(1) and 30(1) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African
Community. National instruments include Tanzania’s Electronic and Postal
Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2020; Electronic and Postal
Communications Act, Cap. 306; Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act,
Cap. 172; and Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, especially
Articles 18 and 30. Regional and international instruments include the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 9; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Article 19; and Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Article 3. Related EACJ cases include Burundian Journalists Union v
Attorney General of Burundi, Reference No. 7 of 2013; Media Council of Tanzania
and Others v Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania, Reference No.
2 of 2017; and The Managing Editor, Mseto and Others v Attorney General of
Tanzania, Reference No. 7 of 2016.
Suggested Citation
Ronald Serwanga, “Internet Speech and EACJ Review of Tanzania’s Rules” (East Africa Legal Insight, 14 October 2026).