ECOWAS Court Ruling on Manneh: Detention and Rights
The Manneh judgment shows how regional litigation can expose secret detention, but also why proof, fair procedure and realistic remedies matter.
Contents
Why Manneh remains important
A journalist disappears into State custody
The Court’s legal questions and evidence
The decision and the rule of law
The importance of the State’s absence
Cessation, restoration and damages
The Gambia’s present framework
Regional comparison with East Africa
What advocates and officials can learn
Why Manneh remains important
Chief Ebrimah Manneh v Republic of The
Gambia is a leading ECOWAS Community Court authority on arbitrary detention and
State accountability. It is also a case about the evidential burden when a
respondent government refuses to participate. The Court awarded a declaration,
ordered release and restoration of rights, granted US$100,000 in damages and
costs, and found The Gambia liable under the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. It treated detention without a disclosed reason, charge or
trial as a continuing violation that a State could not defend through silence.
The decision is sometimes retold simply: a
journalist was arrested, the government denied him, and the ECOWAS Court
ordered his release. The judgment is more demanding. The applicant called
witnesses, presented evidence of arrest and detention, and showed that efforts
to learn his whereabouts had failed. The Court gave the State repeated
opportunities to appear, cross-examine witnesses and give its account. Default
did not automatically prove every allegation. The Court required evidence even
in the defendant’s absence.
The case is useful to a person held
incommunicado, but its precedential lesson extends beyond disappearance. It
explains the connection between liberty, the right to have one’s cause heard,
dignity and effective remedy. It also sets a pleading limit: Manneh claimed
five million US dollars but did not plead and prove a financial basis for
special damages. The Court’s award of general damages reflected the seriousness
and duration of the violations, not the amount demanded. It is both a rights
precedent and a practical guide to litigating remedies.
A journalist disappears into State custody
Ebrimah Manneh worked as a journalist for
The Daily Observer in Banjul. Witnesses said that on 11 July 2006 National
Intelligence Agency officials arrested him at the newspaper premises without
showing a warrant or explaining the reason. Afterward colleagues and family
could not obtain reliable information about his whereabouts. Witnesses
described efforts to trace him among police stations and detention facilities.
He was not charged or brought before a court, and his lawyers’ demand for
release was ignored. The applicant also alleged incommunicado detention, poor
conditions, solitary confinement and inadequate medical care.
The application was filed at the ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice as ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07 and decided as
ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/08. The Republic was duly served but did not file a defence or
appear despite adjournments and further notices. The Court proceeded only after
giving The Gambia a further opportunity to attend and cross-examine witnesses.
The applicant was represented by Femi Falana, Chinedum Agwaramgbo and Sola
Egbeyinka. The panel consisted of Justices Anthony Alfred Benin, Awa Nana
Doboya and Tall El-Mansour.
The issues were whether the arrest and
prolonged detention were justified under the African Charter; whether Manneh
was entitled to restoration of liberty and other rights; and whether he proved
entitlement to the five million dollars claimed. The Court also had to confirm
its jurisdiction over an individual human-rights application and the
admissibility of the matter. This was not an ordinary appeal from a Gambian
criminal court. It was a regional proceeding alleging that a Member State’s
treatment of a person violated international human-rights obligations.
The judgment is careful about what it could
establish. The Court was not asked to decide whether Manneh had committed an
offence, and the State did not produce a charge or evidence to support one. Nor
was the Court deciding whether every security agency arrest in The Gambia was
unlawful. It assessed the specific record of an unexplained seizure followed by
prolonged custody without access, charge or trial. That factual precision is
why the case remains useful for lawyers: the precedent follows the evidence of
the applicant’s experience rather than a general political account of the time.
The Court’s legal questions and evidence
The Court relied on Article 9(4) of the
1991 Protocol on the ECOWAS Court, as amended by Supplementary Protocol
A/SP.1/01/05, which gives individuals access for human-rights claims. In Alhaji
Hammani Tidjani v Nigeria and Four Others, the Court had described the steps an
applicant needed to establish jurisdiction under Article 6 of the African
Charter: identify a recognised right, show that the respondent is bound by the
Charter and demonstrate a State act or omission affecting that right. Manneh
framed the detention under Articles 2, 6 and 7(1). Article 2 protects equal
enjoyment of Charter rights; Article 6 protects liberty and personal security;
Article 7 guarantees the right to have one’s cause heard.
The evidence was not limited to the
applicant’s written allegations. Usman S. Darboe, a news editor at the Daily
Observer, testified that he was present when Manneh was taken and later made
inquiries. Yaya Dampha, a journalist, described searching for him at detention
facilities and hearing that he had been moved. Professor Kwame Karikari of the
Media Foundation for West Africa testified to efforts to verify the arrest and
obtain assistance. Their accounts supported one another on the arrest, failure
to charge and government silence. The Court accepted the evidence as credible
and uncontroverted after the State declined another opportunity to attend and
cross-examine.
The legal question was not merely whether a
warrant was shown at the moment of arrest. Under Article 6, a deprivation of
liberty must occur for reasons and conditions laid down by law. Article 7
requires a criminal allegation to be determined by a competent, impartial court
within a reasonable time. The Court considered the absence of a stated reason,
charge and appearance before a court over a period exceeding a year. It
concluded that detention could not be justified under the Charter. The
evidential chain mattered because the State had not admitted its conduct; the
Court relied on testimony, documents and the absence of any lawful explanation.
In a disappearance case, it is often
impossible for the detainee to provide affidavits or instruct counsel. Manneh
demonstrates how indirect but corroborated evidence can fill some of that gap.
The witnesses carefully testified to what each personally saw, what inquiries
they made and what information came from others. That distinction helps a court
evaluate reliability. Counsel should preserve the source of each fact rather
than presenting every report as personal knowledge. A newspaper item may corroborate
a date or public notice, but a witness who was present at the arrest can
establish more directly how the person was taken.
The decision and the rule of law
The Court held that the arrest and
detention violated Articles 2, 6 and 7(1) of the African Charter. It declared
the application admissible, entered judgment for Manneh, ordered The Gambia to
release him without delay upon service of the judgment, directed restoration of
his human rights, especially freedom of movement, and awarded US$100,000 in
damages and costs. The decision was unanimous; it contains no dissenting
opinion. The order was not a finding about guilt or innocence. It was a finding
that the State had not put him before a competent court to decide that
question.
The governing principle is that liberty may
be restricted only according to law, for a legally recognised reason and under
conditions preserving judicial supervision. A State cannot maintain secret or
uncharged detention indefinitely by refusing to disclose a person’s whereabouts
or participate in review proceedings. After arrest, the government must
identify the legal basis for custody, explain the grounds to the detainee, keep
a reliable record of location and produce the detainee before a competent court
within the constitutional period. Failure to do so turns an arrest into
arbitrary detention.
The Court’s reliance on Article 2 is also
meaningful. Disappearance and incommunicado custody prevent the detainee from
using other rights. The person cannot consult a lawyer, challenge detention,
obtain medical attention or answer a charge. Article 2 means Charter rights
belong to every individual without discrimination. Governments cannot weaken
protection for a journalist, critic or unpopular person by keeping legal
process invisible. A court can assess omissions as well as overt acts when
those omissions maintain an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
The importance of the State’s absence
The State’s refusal to appear shaped the
evidence but did not turn silence into automatic victory. The Court noted that
evidence had to be introduced notwithstanding the defendant’s absence. It gave
the Government time and further notice, then proceeded after it chose not to
attend. That protects fairness to both sides. A State cannot prevent a case
from being heard by declining to defend it; at the same time, the claimant must
prove facts and identify rights violated.
For counsel, default litigation requires
careful preparation. Provide first-hand evidence where possible, statements
from witnesses with different sources of knowledge, dated correspondence
requesting information, proof of service, media or medical material where
relevant, and a chronology of each move or refusal. In Manneh, the witness who
observed the arrest supported the fact and date of seizure; another described
attempts to locate him; and a regional media organisation helped confirm the
information. This triangulation was stronger than a single uncorroborated
allegation.
For a respondent government, silence
carries legal and institutional costs. The State loses the chance to challenge
the identity of officials, contest the chronology, explain a lawful basis for
arrest, show that judicial review was available or argue that the remedy should
be narrower. A timely appearance would not automatically have defeated the
claim, but a reasoned defence could have clarified disputed facts. The Court’s
decision reflects a practical accountability principle: governments control
custody records and have a responsibility to make them available when detention
is challenged.
Counsel should not rely on the State’s
default alone. They should file the notices, affidavits and witness statements
needed to demonstrate jurisdiction and merits, and should seek leave to produce
documents where provenance is important. A government may appear at a late
stage, so service, deadlines and opportunity to respond should be carefully
recorded. The judgment’s method—giving repeated notice, hearing witnesses and
then deciding on the record—offers an example of how a regional court can
protect access to justice without dispensing with proof.
Cessation, restoration and damages
The Court’s first concern was to end the
ongoing violation. The release order shows that a rights remedy should change
the person’s situation, not merely declare that something went wrong.
Restoration of freedom of movement also recognised that detention affects more
than time spent in a cell: it disrupts work, family relationships, health,
reputation and participation in public life. The Court did not order a criminal
investigation or detailed institutional reform plan, but it directed cessation,
restoration, compensation and costs.
The applicant requested US$5 million. The
Court explained the difference between special damages, which are quantifiable
losses and must be specifically pleaded and proved, and general damages, which
compensate for suffering, emotional trauma, loss of reputation or impairment of
life. It found serious harm and awarded US$100,000 in general damages. It
rejected punitive damages as the ordinary aim of human-rights adjudication,
which is cessation or just satisfaction rather than punishment without a proper
basis.
This gives a direct pleading lesson. If a
claimant seeks lost income, medical expenses, business loss or other measurable
harm, each item should be pleaded, supported by records and linked to
detention. Evidence may include employment contracts, pay slips, invoices,
medical reports, family support obligations and expenses. General damages can
account for gravity and duration, but a court still needs an explanation of
injury and legal basis. Lawyers should request separate heads of remedy rather
than placing a large total in the prayer.
The Court relied on persuasive comparative
authorities, including Selmouni v France and R (Greenfield) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department, to explain that human-rights remedies focus on
protection and just satisfaction rather than punitive damages. Those
authorities did not bind the ECOWAS Court; the judges treated other
international decisions as useful guidance. The binding foundation remained the
African Charter, ECOWAS instruments and the Court’s own law. Comparative
citations should illuminate the governing rule, not displace it.
The Gambia’s present framework
The judgment assessed conduct in 2006 under
The Gambia’s 1997 Constitution and the African Charter. The Gambian
Constitution remains the domestic point of reference for arrest and detention
protections. Section 19 protects personal liberty and provides that an arrested
or detained person must be informed promptly of the reasons for arrest and the
right to consult a legal practitioner. It generally requires a person detained
on suspicion of a criminal offence to be brought before a court within 72
hours, subject to the section’s terms. Section 24 protects fair-hearing rights.
Criminal procedure statutes and security-agency laws add procedures but cannot
erase constitutional safeguards.
The African Charter remains binding on The
Gambia and central to the ECOWAS Court’s human-rights jurisdiction. Article 6
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; Article 7 protects access to a
hearing; Article 1 requires States Parties to recognise rights and adopt
measures to give them effect. The 2005 Supplementary Protocol amended the
ECOWAS Court system to permit individual human-rights cases. Article 9(4) of
the amended Court Protocol and Article 10(d) of the Supplementary Protocol
should be checked against official consolidated texts when filing, because
later procedural rules may affect form, admissibility and remedy.
Manneh has particular force because
journalists and political critics faced serious risks at the time. Yet the
decision should not be applied as if every arrest without a visible warrant is
automatically unlawful. National law can permit warrantless arrest in specified
circumstances; the State must still comply with notice, access to counsel and
prompt judicial review. The question is not whether every arrest is preceded by
a warrant, but whether the State can identify a lawful basis and satisfy
safeguards. Here, the State never gave an explanation, filed no charge and
produced no court-supervised process.
Regional comparison with East Africa
Manneh arose under ECOWAS, not the East
African Community. The ECOWAS Court is the regional forum for a human-rights
claim against The Gambia. Its individual access mechanism differs from the
EACJ’s Treaty reference procedure. Under the EAC Treaty, a legal or natural
person may refer a Treaty infringement under Article 30, but the EACJ has
repeatedly said that it is not a general human-rights court. Katabazi shows how
detention-related conduct may come before the EACJ when framed as a Treaty
rule-of-law violation; it does not make the EACJ an alternative ECOWAS Court
for Gambian applicants.
Domestic East African laws provide a useful
comparison of first-line safeguards. Kenya’s Constitution Articles 49 and 50
protect arrested persons and accused persons, including prompt notice of
reasons, access to counsel and production before a court within 24 hours.
Uganda’s Constitution Articles 23 and 28 protect liberty and fair hearing, and
Article 50 provides for enforcement. Tanzania’s Constitution Article 13 and
criminal procedure laws protect legality and fair process. Rwanda’s
Constitution and Law No. 027/2019 relating to criminal procedure regulate
arrest, custody, prosecution and judicial review. The deadlines and remedies
differ; counsel must apply the instrument of the jurisdiction where detention
occurred rather than importing another State’s time limit.
What the cases share is an institutional
point: regional accountability is strongest when a national judge has an
enforceable opportunity to examine detention and State agencies follow the
decision. Katabazi involved armed obstruction of a bail order, while Manneh
involved prolonged secret detention and a refusal to account for custody. Their
facts and jurisdictional bases differ, but each warns that detention is not an
administrative space outside law. East African comparisons help explain why
Manneh matters but should not be presented as binding EAC law or a precedent
the EACJ would apply directly to The Gambia.
Domestic litigation may be quicker because
national courts can direct police, prison authorities and prosecutors. A
regional case can provide an international finding and authoritative Charter
interpretation when local proceedings are ineffective or unavailable. Counsel
should compare costs, safety, admissibility, deadlines, access to evidence and
enforcement prospects. Manneh supports strategic use of regional justice, not
an assumption that every local remedy is useless or that regional litigation
automatically succeeds.
What advocates and officials can learn
For an advocate, Manneh suggests a
sequence. Establish that State agents took the person through direct witnesses,
video, records or a reliable chain of reports. Document every attempt to locate
the detainee and obtain the reason for custody. Identify domestic rules on
prompt notice, access to counsel and production before court. Plead African
Charter rights separately: liberty under Article 6, fair hearing under Article
7 and equal entitlement under Article 2. Establish the ECOWAS Court’s
jurisdiction and admissibility. Finally, ask for a remedy that can halt the
continuing breach and separately identify any monetary loss that can be proved.
The applicants’ team did not win the full
monetary amount, but represented the rights claim effectively. Counsel relied
on corroborating witnesses, used the State’s failure to explain detention as
part of the evidential picture and supported the regional claim with
constitutional safeguards and Charter provisions. The weakness was the damages
claim: the record did not justify five million dollars in special or punitive
damages. Future counsel can preserve the strength of the rights claim while
improving remedial proof. If a detainee cannot instruct counsel, relatives,
colleagues and lawyers should record what they personally know and distinguish
it from second-hand information.
For public authorities, keep traceable
custody records, notify a detainee of the legal basis for arrest, provide
access to a lawyer, enable prompt judicial oversight and respond to lawful
inquiries. For courts, ensure a defaulting State cannot derail adjudication but
evidence is still tested for reliability. For civil society, document patterns
without treating media reports alone as proof of an individual’s facts. No
dissenting judgment offers a different interpretation. The majority’s reasoning
is operative, with qualifications on proof, compensation and the relationship
between ending abuse and awarding money.
Manneh’s most durable message is that the State must be able to account for a person it has taken into custody. A regional judgment cannot itself guarantee compliance, but it can make secrecy legally visible, define violated rights and establish what an effective remedy should restore.
Sources Mentioned in This Case Analysis
The authorities discussed are Chief Ebrimah
Manneh v Republic of The Gambia, ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07 and ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/08,
[2008] ECOWASCJ 7; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Articles 1, 2,
6 and 7; Revised ECOWAS Treaty, Article 4(g); Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the ECOWAS
Court, as amended by Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05; Alhaji Hammani
Tidjani v Nigeria and Four Others, ECW/CCJ/APP/01/06; Selmouni v France (2000)
29 EHRR 403; R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]
UKHL 14; Constitution of The Gambia 1997, sections 19 and 24; Gambian Criminal
Procedure Code; Kenya Constitution 2010, Articles 49 and 50; Uganda
Constitution 1995, Articles 23, 28 and 50; Tanzania Constitution, Article 13;
Rwanda Constitution and Law No. 027/2019 relating to criminal procedure; and
Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the EAC, Reference 1 of 2007.
Suggested Citation:
Ronald Serwanga, “ECOWAS Court Ruling on Manneh: Detention and Rights” East Africa Legal Insight (18 October 2026).