African Court Jurisdiction in the Congo Rwanda Case

The African Court’s ruling in Democratic Republic of Congo v Republic of Rwanda (Application No. 007/2023) [2025] AfCHPR 31 (26 June 2025) is a landmark in the procedure of interstate human-rights litigation. The Court held that it had jurisdiction and that the application was admissible, allowing the dispute to proceed to a merits phase. It did not decide whether Rwanda had committed the alleged violations. That distinction is essential: the ruling opens the courtroom door; it does not determine responsibility for the armed conflict or establish the truth of the allegations.

The judgment was delivered by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights at Arusha. The panel comprised President Modibo Sacko, Vice-President Chafika Bensaoula, and Judges Rafaâ Ben Achour, Suzanne Mengue, Tujilane R. Chizumila, Blaise Tchikaya, Stella I. Anukam, Imani D. Aboud, Dumisa B. Ntsebeza, Dennis D. Adjei and Duncan Gaswaga. The published ruling contains the Court’s operative ruling on jurisdiction and admissibility; it does not report a separate dissenting opinion.

The case is useful to East African lawyers because Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are both central to the Great Lakes region, and the underlying conflict has cross-border implications. Yet it is an African Union Court case, not an EACJ case. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, domestic constitutions, the African Charter and the Great Lakes instruments operate in different legal settings. A careful article must keep those sources in their proper lanes while explaining how a regional court may assess claims concerning conduct that allegedly occurred beyond the respondent State’s territory.

Contents

Why the ruling is a milestone

Brief facts; The questions before the Court

What the Court held; The legal principle

Jurisdiction and cross-border responsibility

Admissibility and competing processes

How the pleadings shaped the outcome

East African comparative perspective

Practical lesson; Conclusion

Why the ruling is a milestone

The African Court was established to interpret and apply the African Charter and other human-rights instruments that a State has accepted. Its institutional design is usually discussed through individual and Commission applications. DRC v Rwanda puts a State-to-State human-rights case at the centre of the Court’s work. It shows that a dispute between governments can also present a judicial question about the rights of people affected by conflict, and that the absence of a conventional interstate dispute does not necessarily prevent the Court from hearing a case grounded in human-rights instruments.

A merits hearing is possible only if a court has jurisdiction and the application satisfies admissibility rules. Rwanda raised objections to both. Their rejection means that a State cannot block a human-rights application merely by describing the dispute as political or military. The Court examines the legal basis pleaded, the treaties in force, the connection to protected rights, and the procedural requirements in its Protocol and Rules.

But the ruling’s importance should not be overstated. The Court did not determine the lawfulness of the conflict, the conduct of any armed group, individual criminal responsibility, the scope of reparations or the factual truth of every allegation in the DRC’s application. It decided whether the case could proceed. Governments, journalists and litigants should avoid presenting it as a final judgment that Rwanda violated the African Charter. The merits remain separate and require proof.

Brief facts

On 21 August 2023, the Democratic Republic of the Congo filed Application No. 007/2023 against Rwanda. The DRC alleged serious human-rights violations connected with the armed conflict in North Kivu and the activities of the M23 armed group and Rwandan forces. The alleged violations included rights to life and physical integrity, dignity, liberty, fair hearing, education and other protections under the African Charter and several related regional and international instruments.

Rwanda contested the Court’s authority and the application’s admissibility. Among other points, it argued that there was no dispute of the kind required for the Court to exercise jurisdiction, that some instruments relied on were not human-rights treaties, that the Court could not rule on extraterritorial conduct, and that the DRC had not followed other available procedures. Rwanda also raised objections connected with local remedies, other regional processes, parallel proceedings, abuse of process and the use of media material.

The Court held a public hearing on jurisdiction and admissibility on 12 and 13 February 2025 and issued its ruling on 26 June 2025. It found that it had jurisdiction and declared the application admissible. It directed the process to continue toward Rwanda’s response on the merits. These procedural facts are the safe basis for describing the judgment; the allegations themselves remain allegations unless and until proved in the later proceedings.

The questions before the Court

The first legal question was whether Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the Court gave it material jurisdiction to consider the DRC’s claims. That required the Court to decide whether the case fell within its mandate to interpret and apply the African Charter and other relevant human-rights instruments. Rwanda argued, in effect, that the matter was a political or interstate conflict outside the Court’s remit and that some of the instruments cited were not human-rights instruments.

The second question concerned jurisdiction over alleged violations outside Rwanda. The DRC said the alleged conduct was attributable to Rwanda and affected rights on Congolese territory. The Court had to consider whether a State may be answerable under human-rights law for conduct beyond its borders where it exercises relevant authority or control, and whether that question could be resolved at the preliminary stage without deciding the underlying facts conclusively.

The third question was admissibility. The Court considered whether the DRC had to exhaust local remedies or pursue other regional mechanisms first, whether parallel proceedings barred the application, whether the application amounted to an abuse of process, and how to treat information drawn from media sources. The Court had to distinguish the threshold inquiry from final proof: at the admissibility stage, it was not deciding whether each alleged violation had actually occurred.

What the Court held

The Court rejected Rwanda’s jurisdictional objections and found that it had jurisdiction to hear the application. It interpreted its human-rights mandate broadly enough to encompass the DRC’s claims under the African Charter and the applicable instruments. The Court did not accept that the absence of an additional, conventional dispute between the two States automatically removed the case from its jurisdiction. A State may bring a case to protect human rights, and the legal character of the claims is not determined only by the fact that armed conflict lies behind them.

On extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court accepted that human-rights responsibility can arise where a State’s agents exercise effective authority, control or relevant power over persons or territory beyond the State’s borders. The ruling allowed the DRC’s allegations of Rwanda’s direct involvement and support to proceed to examination. It did not finally establish that Rwanda exercised such control in the manner alleged; that question belongs to the merits and depends on evidence and attribution rules.

The Court also declared the application admissible and rejected Rwanda’s preliminary objections on procedural grounds. It did not require the DRC to exhaust domestic remedies in the ordinary individual-petition sense. It also considered the Great Lakes regional arrangements and other procedures, and did not treat them as an exclusive route barring the Court’s jurisdiction. The existence of parallel proceedings, without a prior merits decision resolving the same matter, did not automatically make the African Court application inadmissible.

The legal effect is therefore limited but significant. The DRC’s case may continue and Rwanda must answer the allegations in the next phase. The Court has not yet found a Charter violation, fixed state responsibility or ordered reparations. The ruling is binding within the proceedings and authoritative in the African Court system on the jurisdictional and admissibility questions it actually decides.

The legal principle

The central rule is that the African Court may hear a human-rights application between States where the claims fall within the Court’s power to interpret and apply the African Charter or other relevant human-rights instruments, even when the underlying events are political or military and even where alleged conduct occurred outside the respondent State’s territory. The Court must still establish the relevant jurisdictional links, the parties’ treaty status, a legally sufficient connection between the facts alleged and the instruments invoked, and compliance with the applicable rules of admissibility.

A further principle is that human-rights jurisdiction is not automatically confined to a State’s geographical borders. The issue is whether the State exercised authority or control over the persons, territory or conduct relevant to the alleged violation. That standard requires a careful factual inquiry. A claimant must identify the legal basis for attribution, the conduct alleged, where it occurred, who acted, and the relationship between the respondent State and those actors. A label such as ‘support’ or ‘intervention’ is not proof by itself.

Finally, jurisdiction and admissibility are not findings on the merits. A decision that an application is admissible means that the Court may examine it; it does not mean the applicant has proved its case. This distinction is particularly important in interstate cases because allegations may be politically charged and the consequences of misdescription are serious. The ordinary reader should understand the ruling as permission for judicial examination, not a verdict that one State is already liable.

Jurisdiction and cross-border responsibility

The decision’s cross-border dimension is its most important doctrinal contribution. Human-rights duties are usually implemented by national authorities within their own territory, but they can be engaged outside national borders where a State exercises power over people or places. This matters where a State’s armed forces operate abroad, where persons are held by its agents across a border, or where a State’s actions materially shape conditions in territory controlled by others.

The Court’s approach should not be read as making every indirect political influence enough to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. The applicant still has to prove a legally meaningful connection between the State and the relevant conduct. For conflict-related claims, that may involve troop presence, command or operational control, direction of armed groups, material support, the ability to prevent or stop conduct, and the specific rights affected. The exact test and its application must be answered against the evidence in the merits phase.

This is where human-rights responsibility differs from criminal responsibility. The Court is not trying individual soldiers or members of armed groups in this ruling. It is asking whether a State has obligations under the instruments before it and whether its attributable conduct breached those obligations. Criminal cases may focus on the guilt of identified people under criminal standards of proof. A state-responsibility case addresses the conduct of the State and may involve different rules on attribution, due diligence, prevention and reparation.

The ruling also leaves room for other legal bodies to perform their own functions. The International Court of Justice, the East African Court of Justice, the African Commission, domestic courts and international criminal institutions each have different jurisdictional bases and remedies. The African Court did not turn itself into a general court for all international disputes. It proceeded because the application alleged violations of rights under treaties the Court is empowered to apply.

Admissibility and competing processes

Admissibility rules serve important purposes. They give States a chance to remedy violations through domestic institutions, prevent duplicative litigation, ensure cases are brought in good faith and give courts a manageable record. But those rules must be applied in light of the type of applicant and proceeding. Rules designed for an individual petition against a State do not always map neatly onto a State-to-State case alleging widespread violations across a conflict zone.

The DRC ruling is useful for lawyers because it shows that parallel regional processes do not automatically bar a case. The correct question is whether there has been a decision on the merits or a settlement that legally resolves the same claim, rather than whether another institution has been asked to address related events. A party raising lis pendens or duplication should identify the other case, parties, claims, stage and relief, and explain how the governing admissibility rule applies. Merely listing other institutions or peace processes is not enough.

The Great Lakes Pact and other regional arrangements are relevant because they reflect commitments concerning peace, security, cooperation and human rights among states in the region. Rwanda argued that certain instruments were not human-rights treaties or were directed to peace and security. The Court examined their relevance within its own jurisdictional framework. A treaty can have multiple subjects, and provisions on peace and regional security may intersect with human-rights protection. Still, the Court’s jurisdiction does not arise from every regional instrument; the applicant must show that the Court is empowered to interpret or apply the instrument invoked.

The media-evidence issue raises a practical point. News reports can identify events, dates, places and possible witnesses, but they may not prove the truth of disputed allegations. At the merits stage, parties should support allegations with independent and specific material: official documents, satellite or geospatial evidence, forensic records, testimony, expert reports, authenticated communications and reliable investigations. The admissibility ruling does not convert press accounts into conclusive proof.

How the pleadings shaped the outcome

The DRC’s strongest procedural choice was to frame the case around specific rights and instruments rather than ask the African Court to resolve the entire conflict. Its application identified alleged obligations under Article 1 of the African Charter and Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and invoked protections including life, physical integrity, dignity, liberty, fair hearing and education. It also referred to the Protocol on the Rights of Women and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child where relevant to affected groups.

The advocacy challenge for the applicant now moves from jurisdiction to proof. The DRC must connect alleged acts to Rwanda through admissible evidence and show how those acts violated each right. Claims about M23, the Rwanda Defence Force and cross-border support require careful differentiation: which conduct is attributed to state organs, which to non-state actors, and what facts support each attribution? A pleading that treats every armed actor as interchangeable risks obscuring the legal chain that must be proved.

Rwanda’s objections were legally useful in clarifying the limits of the Court’s role, but they did not persuade the Court to stop the case at the threshold. An effective jurisdictional objection must engage the text of Article 3(1), the instruments pleaded, and the jurisprudence on extraterritorial control and inter-State access. A general assertion that a dispute is political or belongs in diplomacy will not answer a human-rights claim if the applicant has identified a treaty basis that the Court can apply.

For both sides, the procedural phase rewards precision. The applicant should separate jurisdiction, admissibility and merits; the respondent should identify which defect belongs to which stage. Arguments that treat all questions as one broad challenge invite the Court to reject them as insufficiently specific. The Court’s ruling reflects a judicial method: first determine legal authority, then assess procedural admissibility, and only afterward examine whether the evidence establishes responsibility.

East African comparative perspective

The case directly concerns the DRC, Rwanda and African Union instruments; it is not an application under the East African Community Treaty. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court Protocol, the ICCPR, the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, the African Children’s Charter, the African Union Constitutive Act and the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region are among the relevant regional or international instruments discussed. Lawyers should not cite national East African laws as if the African Court relied on them unless the judgment actually does so.

Comparatively, national constitutions in the region often protect life, dignity, equality, liberty, fair hearing and education. Uganda’s Constitution, Rwanda’s Constitution and Kenya’s Constitution provide domestic routes for rights claims against state authorities. The EAC Treaty’s Articles 6(d) and 7(2) bind Partner States to principles of good governance, the rule of law and recognition of human rights. These instruments can help readers understand how regional duties echo domestic protections, but their procedures and jurisdictional tests differ from those of the African Court.

The EACJ’s case law offers a useful contrast. In James Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the EAC and Attorney General of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007, the EACJ held that it could interpret the EAC Treaty even where the facts raised human-rights concerns, while not claiming an unimplemented general human-rights jurisdiction. In Attorney General of the Republic of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba, Appeal No. 1 of 2012, [2012-2015] EACJLR 204, the Court reviewed detention through Treaty obligations. DRC v Rwanda proceeds under the African Court’s own Protocol and expressly pleaded human-rights instruments. The comparison helps show why forum selection and legal framing matter.

For an East African practitioner, the lesson is not that the African Court now replaces domestic courts or the EACJ. It is that overlapping legal systems may each address a different part of a cross-border problem. A national court may remedy an individual domestic violation; the EACJ may assess compliance with EAC Treaty duties; the African Court may examine state obligations under the African Charter and related human-rights instruments. The claim must be matched to the forum’s jurisdiction, admissibility rules and available remedies.

Practical lesson

A State bringing an interstate application should begin by identifying the precise instrument that gives the Court jurisdiction and confirming that both States are bound by it. It should plead the facts supporting jurisdiction separately from the facts proving the merits. It should also address every foreseeable admissibility objection, including exhaustion, parallel proceedings, prior settlement, abuse of process and the reliability of evidence. In cross-border cases, the application should distinguish territorial location, state-agent conduct, control, attribution and the rights of the affected people.

A respondent State should build a preliminary objection from the treaty text and record, not only from political characterizations. If it says that another process should be used first, it should show why that process is legally mandatory or exclusive and what remedy it can deliver. If it disputes jurisdiction over conduct abroad, it should engage the evidence about authority and control. If it says a claim is duplicative, it should identify whether the other forum has actually decided the same matter on the merits.

For the ordinary person, the procedural outcome can be summarized simply: the African Court agreed to hear the DRC’s case and rejected Rwanda’s attempt to stop it at the beginning. The Court has not yet ruled that the allegations are true. This careful distinction helps public discussion remain accurate while allowing victims, governments and lawyers to follow the merits process.

Conclusion

Democratic Republic of Congo v Republic of Rwanda is a major African Court authority on interstate access, human-rights jurisdiction and alleged violations beyond national borders. The Court, sitting as an eleven-judge panel led by President Modibo Sacko, found jurisdiction and admissibility on 26 June 2025. Its ruling allows the application to proceed; it does not decide whether Rwanda violated the rights alleged. For regional litigation, the lasting lesson is to choose the right forum, plead the treaty basis precisely, separate threshold questions from merits, and build a record capable of proving cross-border responsibility.

Sources Mentioned in This Case Analysis

The authorities referred to above are Democratic Republic of Congo v Republic of Rwanda (Application No. 007/2023) [2025] AfCHPR 31 (26 June 2025); Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region; Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Articles 6(d) and 7(2); James Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the EAC and Attorney General of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007; Attorney General of the Republic of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba, Appeal No. 1 of 2012, [2012-2015] EACJLR 204.

Suggested Citation

Ronald Serwanga, “African Court Jurisdiction in the Congo Rwanda Case” East Africa Legal Insight (23 October 2026).