Free Speech Does Not Protect Harmful Online Rumours

Online speech now moves at a speed that the law is still learning to manage. A message shared in a WhatsApp group can reach hundreds of people before breakfast. A Facebook post can be copied into screenshots, reposted on X, discussed on YouTube, and repeated on TikTok before anyone checks whether it is true. That speed gives ordinary people a powerful voice. It also creates a real risk that harmful rumours can damage dignity, cause fear, or disturb public order before correction is possible.

The legal question is not whether people should be free to speak. Freedom of expression is a constitutional right and remains essential to public life. People must be able to criticise public officials, report wrongdoing, question institutions, defend unpopular opinions, and participate in political and social debate. The harder question is where protected expression ends and knowingly harmful online rumour begins. That is the question raised by the 2025 Rwandan constitutional challenge to Article 39 of Law No. 60/2018 on the prevention and punishment of cyber crimes.

In that matter, lawyer Jean Paul Ibambe challenged Article 39, arguing in substance that the provision restricted freedom of expression in digital spaces and risked being used against journalists, whistleblowers, critics, and ordinary citizens. The Supreme Court of Rwanda dismissed the petition on 5 June 2025. Public reports of the decision indicate that the Court held Article 39 compatible with the Constitution, while emphasising that freedom of expression is protected but not absolute. The reported reasoning focused on specific harms, including fear, violence, disorder, and unjust harm to another person's dignity or credibility. It also treated the requirement that the conduct be done knowingly as an important safeguard.

The principle can be explained in plain terms. A person has the right to speak, criticise, publish, ask questions, and share information. But that right does not give a person a licence to knowingly publish harmful falsehoods through computer systems where the publication may cause public fear, violence, insurrection, or serious injury to another person's dignity or credibility. The focus is not on silencing disagreement. At least as reported, the decision appears to draw a line between lawful expression and knowingly harmful rumour presented as fact.

That distinction matters because online communication is often informal. People may type quickly, forward messages without checking, or post allegations because they are angry, amused, or trying to be first. Yet informality does not make publication legally harmless. A post made from a phone can still injure a person, disturb a community, or create panic. A rumour that names a business, a teacher, a public official, or a neighbour can have consequences long after the original post is deleted.

At the same time, caution is necessary. Laws regulating online rumours can be misused if they are applied too broadly. A democracy needs uncomfortable speech. Journalists must be able to investigate. Civil society must be able to criticise. Citizens must be able to question official narratives. Mistakes, satire, suspicion, and unpopular opinion should not automatically be treated as crimes. The requirement that publication be done knowingly is therefore important. It suggests that the law should not be stretched to punish every error, every careless expression, or every statement that annoys powerful people.

The case is different from ordinary defamation, although the two areas can overlap. Defamation usually focuses on injury to reputation. The digital speech issue discussed here is wider. It concerns the constitutional balance between expression, dignity, public order, and the responsible use of computer systems. A false statement about a person may damage reputation. A rumour about violence, public danger, or communal hostility may also create fear or disorder. Digital platforms amplify both kinds of harm.

For ordinary users, the lesson is not to stop speaking. It is to speak with care where serious factual allegations are involved. Before posting or forwarding a serious claim, a person should pause and ask whether the information is known to be true, whether it can be verified, whether it names a person or business, whether it may cause panic or hostility, and whether it is opinion or a factual claim. These questions are not only legal precautions. They are also basic habits of responsible public communication.

For bloggers, journalists, activists, and civil society actors, the decision may be read with both reassurance and concern. The reassurance is that the reported reasoning recognises that freedom of expression is protected and that the law targets knowing conduct linked to serious harm. The concern is that enforcement must remain careful. A provision intended to address harmful rumours should not become a tool for discouraging legitimate criticism. The real test of such a law is often not only how the court describes it, but how police, prosecutors, and lower courts apply it in ordinary cases.

For East African legal education, the case is useful because it frames online speech disputes as balance cases rather than simple punishment cases. The relevant balance is between the speaker's right to express ideas, the public's need for reliable and safe information, and the dignity and security of people affected by harmful digital content. That balance is not always easy. It requires courts to protect expression while refusing to excuse knowing falsehoods that cause serious harm.

The everyday message can be stated simply: speak freely, criticise fairly, and ask difficult questions, but do not knowingly publish harmful rumours as if they were facts. Freedom of expression is strongest when it protects honest criticism and public debate. It is weakened, not strengthened, when digital spaces are flooded with false claims that injure people or create fear. The 2025 Supreme Court decision therefore offers a modern reminder that social media is not outside the law, even though lawful opinion and responsible criticism remain protected.

Source note. This article is based on the 2025 Supreme Court of Rwanda ruling concerning Jean Paul Ibambe's petition challenging Article 39 of Law No. 60/2018 on the prevention and punishment of cyber crimes, reported as issued on 5 June 2025, together with public materials from Rwanda's Amategeko portal and reports on the constitutional challenge. It also refers generally to Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda on freedom of expression, press freedom, and access to information. It is prepared for public legal education only and should not be treated as legal advice for any specific publication or cyber crime matter.

Suggested citation

Ronald Serwanga, “Free Speech Does Not Protect Harmful Online Rumours” East Africa Legal Insight (30 May 2026).